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Trickle-Down Democracy:
The Commission Government Contest
in Des Moines, 1905-1908
ROBERT E. BIONAZ
"AW, WHAT'S THE USE!" exclaimed the Des Moines Register
and Leader's front-page cartoon caption on the morning of March
31, 1908 (see cover). J. N. "Ding" Darling's artistic rendering of
the previous day's election results depicted a disconsolate "citi-
zen"—staring morosely at the ground from his seat atop an over-
turned bucket—contemplating the empty promise of the recent
election and Des Moines's grim future.' Darling's artistry cap-
tured the bitter disappointment of the elite men and their allies
who had led the fight for commission government in Des Moines
between 1905 and 1908, and who had just seen the city's voters
reject their entire hand-picked and heavily promoted "people's"
ticket. Just over rune months earlier, that same group of busi-
ness and professional leaders had tasted victory when the city's
voters approved their plan for a commission government to
replace tiie old mayor and council system. The pleasure those
reformers felt in 1907 and the anguish they experienced in 1908
represent two sides of the same coin. Although the commission
government drive in Des Moines stemmed from the desire of
business and professional elites to create a government respon-
sive to their interests, in the end they got only the system they
wanted, not the control they desired through the election of the
"right" men.
1. Des Moines Register and Leader, 31 March 1908.
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The commission government idea gained momentum dur-
ing the Progressive Era^  as more than 500 cities in 41 states
adopted a more centralized form of government between 1907
and 1920. The Des Moines campaign illustrates that such reform
could be hotly contested, as reformers and their opponents con-
tinued the long-running American debate over who should rule
and how.^  Pro-commission reformers, many driven as much by
the desire to profit from the business opportunities created by
an expanding city as by the desire for efficiency sought to re-
place the system of ward representation with what they char-
acterized as a more businesslike, efficient, honest, and central-
ized city government. At meetings and in newspapers, these re-
formers argued that the public good stemmed from business
prosperity: in a thriving city, booming business and population
growth created wealth that would trickle down to every resi-
dent. These business and professional elites believed that ward
democracy frustrated their efforts to stimulate business growth,
and prevented their social inferiors from realizing both where
their true interests lay and who should properly govern the city.
This vision of municipal government differed from the view
held by many residents of Des Moines's working-class wards.
Led by the city's unions. Des Moines's workers championed a
popular democracy that embraced local representation and as-
sailed the autocratic pretensions of the reformers. Their critique
forced reformers to defend as well as promote the plan and set
the stage for the cross-class alliance that defeated the elite effort
to gain control of the city's elective offices.
Pro-commission spokespersons shrouded in the rhetoric of
efficiency their desire for elite political control, and they skill-
fully used the city's press to create an image of existing munid-
2. See Bradley Robert Rice, Progressive Cities: The Commission Government Move-
ment in America, 1901-1920 (Austin, TX, 1977), 110-11, 113-25. Carl V. Harris,
Political Power in Birmingham, 187U1921 (Knoxville, TN, 1984), reveals the
relationship between class and political power. Lynette Boney Wrenn, Crisis
and Commission Government in Memphis: Elite Rule in a Gilded Age City (Knox-
ville, TN, 1998), explores the antidemocratic potential of commission gov-
ernment, See also Amy Bridges, Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the
Southwest (Princeton, NJ, 1997); and William Issel, "Class and Ethnic Conflict
in San Francisco Political History: The Reform Charter of 1898," Labor His-
tory 18 (1977), 341-59.
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pal corruption. However, in response to their opponents' criti-
cism, and in order to maximize their appeal, pro-commission
spokespersoris had to reformulate their plan to include direct
democracy provisions. Although reformers believed that only
the right kind of businessmen should control the city's business-
like goverrunent. Des Moines's workers fought against "aris-
tocratic" encroachments on their liberties, defended popular
democracy, and ultimately rejected the leadership of business
interests allied with the city's press. In the end, neither side got
exactly what it desired.^
THE DISSATISFACTION of the city's business and profes-
sional elites with city goverrunent marufested itself in the strug-
gle to restructure and reform the municipal goverrunent in
1907-8—an effort that raises the question of why Des Moines's
reformers were so discontented with the city's management.
Although their rhetoric featured frequent discussions of ineffi-
ciency and corruption at City Hall—two evils commission gov-
ernment promised to eliminate—a look at the municipal govern-
ment's operation in the years just prior to the election of 1907
reveals a picture far different from the one painted by reformers/
3. For cxjntemporary accounts of the commission government phenomena see
Emest S. Bradford, Commission Government in American Cities (New York, 1911);
Clinton Rogers Woodruff, City Government by Commission (New York, 1911);
William Bennett Munro, The Government of American Cities (New York, 1912); and
Charles A. Beard, American City Government: A Sunvy of Newer Tendencies (New
York, 1912). My approach to this topic has been heavily influenced by Samuel P.
Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era,"
Pacific Northivest Quarterly 55 (1964), 157-69. Hays emphasized the differences
between reform ideology and political practice. Locating the source of support
for municipal government reform in the upper classes, he argued that reformers
sought to limit popular participation in municipal affairs through the installation
of a business-controlled city government.
4. Jon Teaford argues that late rüneteenth<entury municipal govenunents gen-
erally operated efficiently—that they represented "a failure not of structure but
of image." Jon C. Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in America,
1870-1900 (Baltimore, 1984), 1-11. Compare Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Or-
der, 1877-1920 (New York, 1967), 112-29; Martin J. Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency:
Municipal Administration and Reform in America, 1800-1920 (Berkeley, CA, 1977),
1-5; James Weinstein, "Orgarüzed Business and the City Commissioner and
Management Movements," Journal of Southern History 18 (1962), 166-67,177-81;
Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York, 1955), 5.
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Des Moines's population increased by 39 percent between
1900 and 1910, growing from 62,139 to 86,368. In 1907 the Cen-
sus Bureau estimated the city's population at just over 81,000. In
1910 the Census Bureau classified 96 percent of the population
as ethnically white and 87 percent of the white population as
native-bom. The majority of the foreign-bom population came
from northem and western Europe. More than one-quarter of
the city's residents were young people between the ages of six
and twenty. Ninety percent of children aged six to fourteen at-
tended school.^
This stable, family-oriented, rapidly growing population
offered opportunities for businessmen to profit, particularly in
industries related to the city's growth: banking, insurance, the
building trades, and real estate. Indeed, in Des Moines the
Commercial Club, an organization of leading business and pro-
fessional men committed to growth and to "boosting" the city's
businesses, consistently stressed the importance of growth in
their vision of a "greater" Des Moines. However, these "boost-
ers" found their efforts hamstrung by a city government they
described as "Des Moines' worst handicap."* By the fall of 1905,
the city-boosting movement and the effort to change the gov-
ernment's structure had become intertwined.
That fall, attorney banker, and real estate developer James G.
BerryhiU returned from a trip to Galveston, Texas, and presented
a glowing report on the efiiciency of that city's commission
government to a group of businessmen described by the Regw-
ter and Leader as "the brains and financial backbone of the city."^
5. Of Des Moines's 10,395 foreign-bom citizens, 7,176, or 69 percent, had emi-
grated from northern or western Europe. The city also had a growing immi-
grant population of eastern and southern Europeans, including 1,408 Russians
and 932 Italians. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United
States: Population (Washington, DC, 1913), 2:636-37, 617; Special Reports: Statistics
of Cities Having a Population of Over 30,000:1907 (Washington, DC, 1910), 132.
6. Des Moines Register and Leader, 13 September 1906.
7. Des hAdnes Register and Leader, 18 November 1905. Galveston, Texas, adopted
the first commission government in 1901, following a disastrous hurricane on
8 September 1900. Although the death and destruction caused by the hurri-
cane lent urgency to efforte to reform the dty's government, according to
Bradley Rice, "charter reform had been on Galveston's agenda for some time,"
at least since 1891. Rice, Progressive Cities, 3-4.
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Des Moines's business and professional leaders embraced the
idea of commission government and quickly formed a commit-
tee to promote it. By January 1906, Berryhill and attorneys W. H.
Baily and John Read had a draft charter ready to present to the
Iowa legislature. Des Moines legislators Cassius Dowell of the
Senate and Horace Teachout of the House introduced the legis-
lation on January 26, but the bill was reported unfavorably in
both chambers. The Register and Leader reported that a joint
meeting of Senate and House Committees on Cities and Towns
had "practically laughed [the bill] out of the legislative com-
mittees."* Although the defeated charter included at-large elec-
tions, provisions for recall, and mandatory submission to the
voters of any appropriation ordinance, or franchise to "occupy
or use the streets, highways, bridges or public places in the city
for any private purpose," direct democracy provisions such as
the initiative and referendum were absent. Undaunted by de-
feat, proponents of the commission plan continued to link mu-
nicipal reform with the booster movement and in the fall of 1906
again began to extol the virtues of centralized government.^
The system of government these reformers wished to re-
place consisted of a mayor and nine aldermen, one elected from
8. 1906 ¡oxva Senate Jouma!, 145, 454; 1906 Iowa House Journal, 210, 534; Des
Moines Registerand Leader, 18 March 1906; Rice, Progressive Cities, 35. According
to Rice, many of the legislators who opposed the measure felt the bill repre-
sented "special legislation for Des Moines." In addition, legislators were unsure
that sufficient public sentiment existed for a change in government structure.
Ibid., 36. See also John F O'Connell, "Des Moines Adopts the Commission
Form of Municipal Government" (M.A. thesis, Drake University, 1975), 53-55.
9. John J. Hamüton, Tlje Dethronement of the City Boss (New York, 1910), 235, 241;
the entire text of the defeated charter is on pp. 231-48. See also Rice, Progressive
Cities, 36. Hamilton, who played a prominent role in both the commission
government contest and the subsequent municipal election, enjoyed a remark-
able career. Described in an obituary as "an aggressive and talented man," he
had interviewed President Rutherford B. Hayes in 1878 on the "race problem."
Following the interview, Hamilton walked from Washington to Richmond, Vir-
ginia, "making inquiries and investigations upon condition of the negro race."
In 1879 he began his newspaper work and Republican Party political activity;
by 1883, he owned an interest in the Des Moines News. In 1904 he retired from
ttie paper and became economic editor of the Iowa Homesteaä. In 1911 he
moved to Pasadena, California, where he served on the city's charter revision
commission, boand of education, and city commission. He continued writing
political commentary until his late eighties, and died on his ninety-third birth-
day, 10 November 1947. Annals of Iowa 29 (1948), 327-28.
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each of the city's seven wards and two elected at large; city-
wide elections also determined the dty treasurer, auditor, police
judge, and solicitor. Much of the city's executive power resided
in the hands of the Board of Public Works, which was appointed
by the mayor and approved by the city council; and "quasi-
independent" boards ran the police and fire departments,
"placing many of the municipality's functior\s beyond the direct
control of the voters." The city's leading citizens were discon-
tented with this "complicated arrangement"; in late 1905 the
Register and Leader claimed that "a general feeling of dissatisfac-
tion over the present management of municipal affairs . . . has
been manifest for some time." Proponents of commission gov-
ernment believed that structural change would streamline and
cleanse municipal government; "good goverrunent," they as-
sumed, "would necessarily flow from efficient machinery""*
Politically, the Republican Party dominated Des Moines in
the decade before 1907. Between 1896 and 1906, Republicans
won at least a majority on the council at each election, including
sweeps in 1902 and 1904. Republicans also won five of six
mayoral races, losing only in 1900, when a group of dissident
Republicans combined with the city's Democrats to support
Democrat J. J. Hartenbower in his successful campaign against
Republican incumbent John MacVicar. MacVicar's support of
public ownership of murücipal utilities had earned him the
enmity of many of the city's Republicans who claimed that he
behaved politically more like a Democrat than a Republican."
Fiscally, the Republican-controlled city government ran in
the black from 1905 to 1908. The treasury's cash surplus in-
creased from $324,736 on March 31,1906, to $392,988 on March
31, 1908. Among the 47 American cities with populations be-
tween 50,000 and 100,000 in 1907, Des Moines ranked tentii in
population, but fifth in per capita spending for education, sev-
10. Des Moines Register and Leader, 9 November 1905; Rice, Progtvssive Cities, 34,
XI.
11. Des Moines Leader, 7 April 1896, 29 March 1898, 27 March 1900; Des Moines
News, 27 March 1900; Imva State Register, 1 April 1902; Des Moines Register and
Leader, 29 March 1904, 28 March 1906; Johnson Brigham, Des Moines: The Pio-
neer of Municipal Progress and Reform of the Middle West, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1911),
1:379.
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enth for streets, ninth for sanitation, fifth for fire protection, and
twenty-ninth for police.'^ Because nearly 80 percent of the dty's
expenditures went toward education, maintenance and improve-
ment of the city's infrastructure, and public protection, and be-
cause the city government ran economically, it is difficult to
credit the Des Moines reformers' claims of "inefficiency." Al-
though the pro-commission press printed frequent stories of
governmental inefficiency in areas such as street cleaning and
streetlight maintenance, complaints about these ineffective ser-
vices came mainly from the more affluent areas of the city's
west side. While it appears that the government managed the
city's finances economically, residents of the city's upper-class
neighborhoods apparently felt that the city was paying insuffi-
cient attention to their needs.'^
Is it possible that these reformers, who were vague about
the sources of their discontent, found reason for dissatisfaction
in a corrupt and ineffective police department? Shock at the
proliferation of saloons, prostitution, violence, and theft might
be sufficient cause to call for a change in government. But the
Des Moines police department seems to have served the dty
honestly. Des Moines's crime statistics indicate that the city was
safe but somewhat disorderly. In 1907 Des Moines police made
8,188 arrests, ranking fourth among their city-size cohort. How-
ever, more than 90 percent of those arrests were for offenses
against society: crimes against chastity, drunkenness, disorderly
conduct, vagrancy, and gambling. The city ranked twenty-first
in its city-size cohort in crimes against persons and twentieth in
crimes against property, while only Oakland, California, had
more arrests for offenses against society. Des Moines ranked fifth
in arrests for gambling among the 47 cities of 50,000 to 100,000
and eighth in total arrests for drunkenness. However, it ranked
twenty-ninth in percentage of arrests for drunkenness relative
12. U.S. Census Bureau, Special Reports: Statistics of Cities Having a Population of
Over 30,000:1905 (Washington, DC, 1907), 131; and Special Reports: 1907 (Wash-
ington, DC, 1910), 143, 354,364,367,370.
13. For accounts of these complaints, see Des Moines Register and Leader, 3 Oc-
tober 1905 and 23 November 1906; Des Moines News, 27 July 1905,15 January,
and 24 March 1906; O'Connell, "Des Moines Adopts Commission Govern-
ment," 17-21.
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to other crimes, in large part because it was so diligent in en-
forcing chastity laws. Only four cities of any size nationwide—
Pittsburgh, Kansas City, Philadelphia, and St. Louis, all with
populations in excess of 185,000—had more arrests for crimes
against chastity; only Salt Lake City had more arrests per capita
for such crimes. New York, with a population 50 times larger
than Des Moines, reported 113 fewer arrests for crimes against
chastity, while Chicago, with a population 26 times larger, had
seven fewer arrests than Iowa's capital. Thus, Des Moines's po-
lice seemed diligent in their attempts to control both prœtituuon
and gambling, two traditional sources of police corruption.'*
When many of Des Moines's reformers talked about cor-
ruption^ they meant political corruption: bribery of voters, bal-
lot box stuffing, and profitable arrangements between dty offi-
cials and contractors or public service corporatioris. Despite
their emphasis on rampant city hall graft, however, the men
who drafted the charter codified as misdemeanors offenses
such as bribery, ballot box stuffing, and kickbacks from con-
tractors or public service corporations. The draft charter pre-
scribed light punishments for public malfeasance, a curious
stance in light of the reform crusade to rid the city of corrupt
politics. As Samuel Hays has observed, either Des Moines's re-
formers "did not oppose corruption per se," or they felt that
reform of the city's political structure would provide a suffident
safeguard against the political excesses of the ward system, or
claims of political corruption offered a convergent rhetorical
trope to use in the battle for reform.'^
14. U.S. Census Bureau, Special Reports: 1907. 131-32, 410-12, 420; Douglas
Wertsch, "The Evolution of the Des Moines Police Department: Professionali-
zation and the Decline of Public Disorder Arrests in the Twentieth Century,"
Annals of Iowa 48 (1987), 435^9.
15. Hamilton, Dethronement c^ the City Boss, 92-97; Hays, "Politics of Reform,"
161. Sections 5a and 5b of the new charter prescribed punishment for election
fraud, and section 13 prohibited dty employees from "interest" in contracting
jobs, their materials or profits, or from acœpting any free passes or service
from public service corporations. Election fraud was punishable by a fine of
between one hundred and five hundred dollars and a jail sentence between
ten and ninety days, while a conviction under section 13 carried a maximum
sentence of thirty days and a fine of three hundred dollars. Hamilton, Dethrone-
ment qfthe City Boss, 194-95,201-3.
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It seems that Des Moines's elites exaggerated both ineffi-
ciency in the city government and political corruption. The
people of Des Moines lived in a city that educated its children,
maintained the city's infrastructure, and controlled its poten-
tially unruly elements. The streets were safe, and the city was
prosperous and expanding. Although some of the city's leading
citizens may have believed that corruption existed in city hall,
even newspaperman John J. Hamilton, a reform spokesperson
and leader, admitted that Des Moines was "not an exceptionally
badly governed city under the old regime."^* How then, did re-
formers argue for a change in city government?
FOLLOWING THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT in 1906, Des
Moines's business and professional leaders realized that a suc-
cessful assault on the existing city government required a uni-
fied, press-supported effort. They began early in 1907 by
building their campaign on the rhetoric of a modem, efficient,
business-like city government. In January 1907 reformers had
to choose between the "Indianapolis Plan" of one-man control
through a strong mayor overseeing the city council, and the
"Galveston Plan" of government by a commission, including a
mayor and four aldermen elected at-large. Hamilton suggested
a debate on the merits of the two plans and in January submit-
ted to the Commercial Club a list of 100 men to judge the de-
bate. The Commercial Club and Greater Des Moines Committee
quickly endorsed the suggestion and expanded the list to 300
names.'^
Throughout the reform campaign, the city's three largest
newspapers—the Register and Leader, the Capital, and the News
—embraced and articulated the reform position.'* As the debate
Id. Hamilton, Dethronement of the City Boss, 92.
17. Ibid., 109-10; Rice, Progressive Cities, 37; Des Moines Register and Leader, 7
January-1 February 1907; Des Moines Capital, 8-12 January 1907.
18. All three newspapers were committed to the city's growth through the
expansion of business opportunities and championed efficient, business-like
methods in city government. While the Register and Leader and Capital styled
themselves "progressive," Republican newspapers and supported Theodore
Roosevelt in 1904, the Neius charted a more independent political course and
frequently railed against monopolies, particularly the railroads.
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was beginning, the Register and Leader and the Capital polled
their readers to determine the level of public support for a
change in city government. The Register and Leader sent letters
to Des Moines's most prominent residents, asking, "Do you
believe that the time is ripe for a movement for better city
government in Des Moines?" and "Have you any opinion as to
tile course that should be pursued to secure it?" The Capital
printed a ballot asking readers to vote either for or against a
change in dty government and to indicate whether they fa-
vored the Indianapolis or Galveston Plan. The Register and
Leader claimed that 117 of 120 respondents wanted a change in
government: 62 favored the Galveston Plan, while 26 supported
the Indianapolis plan. According to the Capital, 606 respondents
preferred the Galveston Plan, 412 the Indianapolis Plan, and
only 23 desired no change." Following these two surveys and a
meeting and debate on January 31, 1907, Des Moines's leading
citizens endorsed the Galveston Plan by a vote of 106 to 27, thus
committing the reformers to a Galveston-style commission gov-
ernment as the cure for Des Moines' "ills."
Who were the "leading citizer\s" driving the commission
plan? Reformers who constituted the Committees of One and
Three Hundred were the cream of Des Moines society: over
three-quarters of the 98 members of the Committee of One
Hundred and nearly 57 percent of the men on the Committee of
Three Hundred had appeared ten years earlier in the 1897-98
Blue Book listing of the city's most socially prominent residents.
Thus, many of the reformers had occupied the top rungs of Des
Moines society for at least a decade, and they considered them-
selves the city's most substantial and influential citizens. Repre-
sentatives of the city's three main newspapers—editor Harvey
Ingham of the Republican Register and Leader, manager Mel Uhl
19. Des Moines Register and Leader, 13 January and 1 February 1907; Rice, Pro-
gressive Cities, 38-39. The group chosen by the paper represented the city's
"best" citizens. Nearly 60 percent were listed in the sodal register, the Des
Moines Blue Book; 25 percent of the men owned businesses or were company
officials, 24 percent were attorneys, 13 percent were bankers, and 13 percent
worked in insurance, real estate, or construction or occupations related to the
construction industry. The Blue Book of Des Moines, Iowa, 1897-98 (Des Moines,
1897); Des Moines City Directory, 1907 (Des Moines, 1907); Des Moines City Di-
rectory, 1908 (Des Moines, 1908).
Commission Government Contest 251
of the independent News, and owner Lafayette Young of the
Republican Capital—served on both committees. Many of the
remairiing members of the two committees tended to be profes-
sionals, mainly physicians and attorneys, or clustered in four
other occupational groups: banking, insurance, real estate, and
construction and building supplies. The Committee of One
Hundred included 32 professionals, 11 men in barüdng, 4 in in-
surance, 5 in real estate, and 5 in construction. The Committee
of Three Hundred included 48 professionals, 35 men in bank-
ing, 26 in insurance, 17 in real estate, and 30 in construction. But
whereas the Committee of One Hundred included only 11 busi-
ness owners or company officers, that number jumped to 73 on
the Committee of Three Hundred. Thus, businessmen commit-
ted to Des Moines's expansion formed the largest group in the
enlarged committee. Using the city's press to trumpet the im-
portance of a new government to Des Moines's growth, these
men sought to effect a political reform that they believed would
help spur expansion and would, incidentally, increase the prof-
its of their businesses.^
The letters these men wrote to the paper reflect the rhetori-
cal emphasis of the early commission campaign. Bar\ker and
business owner John Cownie believed that the city's govern-
ment "should be on a purely business basis and eliminated
from politics," a position endorsed by the majority of the re-
spondents. BarUcer Gilger E. MacKinnon advocated electing "a
business man mayor, with a business man's salary." Attorney
George F. Henry wrote of the importance of "better city gov-
ernment" to the success of "efforts for a 'Great Des Moines.'"
Several respondents mentioned the slogan of Des Moines's
20. Des Moines Register and Leader, 6 and 13 January 1907; Des Moines Capital, 8
and 14 January 1907. Information on the social and occupational composition
of the Des Moines reform movement is drawn from four sources: Vie Blue Book
of Des Moines, ¡owa, 1897-98; Des Moines dty directories for 1907 and 1908;
Who's Who in Des Moines, 1929 (Des Moines, 1929); and biographical sketches
of the most influential people in Des Moines compiled by the Press Club of
Des Moines, A Newspaper Reference Work (Des Moines, 1912). Seventy-six of the
98 members of the Committee of One Hundred and 171 of the 302 members of
the Committee of Three Hundred appeared in the 1897-98 social register.
Many of the people on these two committees combined occupations. For in-
stance, several attorneys and doctors worked for insurance companies or banks
or served as directors of banks or insurance companies.
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boosters, "Des Moines does things/' in their letters, but the full-
est expression of the reformers' mix of civic boosterism and elite
pretensions came from Ulysses G. Swartz, superintendent of the
International Correspondence Schools. Speaking for "all the
better class of citizens" with whom he came into contact daily,
Swartz exhorted his fellow reformers to "push" the commission
plan in order to bring about "tangible action" and to "show the
world" that, indeed. Des Moines was doing things.^'
These people wanted to change the structure of municipal
government because they objected to yielding political control
to people who shared neither their interests nor their vision of a
greater Des Moines. As Samuel Hays wrote in 1964, these men
were simply "dissatisfied with existing systems of municipal
government... that enabled local and particularistic interests to
dominate." In contrast to the prevailing ward system, which,
according to John Hamilton, "encourages a local selfishness de-
structive of the general, and ultimately of the local interests as
well," reformers believed that at-large representation would
allow the community's "common mind" to develop into "domi-
nant public sentiment on every question pending in the com-
munity."" Since a diffuse political system threatened the ability
of business and professional elites to realize their dream of a
great and growing city, they determined to "modernize" and
centralize the city government.
The rhetoric of efficiency, modernization, and centralization,
obscured their true goal: political control by the "better classes"
of Des Moines's citizens, and, incidentally, the opportunity to
shape the city's growth. In order to achieve their goal, they de-
veloped a plan to curb potential democratic excesses. They pro-
posed to reduce the number of elected offices from thirteen to
five and eliminate ward representation, making it more difficult
for a person with limited finandal resources to run for office
since dtywide electioneering would likely be more expensive
than local campaigning. In addition, the charter's initiative sec-
tion mandated that any ordinance passed by the council would
21. Des Moines Register and Leader, 13 January 1907.
22. Hays, "Politics of Reform," 161; Hamilton, Dethronement of the City Boss, 41,
50-51.
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become law within ten days of its passage unless opponents
could secure signatures equal to 25 percent of the vote cast for
mayor at the preceding election. Therefore, the most objection-
able laws could be promulgated, passed by three council mem-
bers (a majority), and become law unless oppor\ents could
gather about 3,000 signatures on an irUtiative petition within ten
days. In short. Des Moines's prominent residents sought to cre-
ate a system that would allow them to exercise political influ-
ence commensurate with their privileged economic status. In
pursuit of that goal, democratic practices became simply an ob-
stacle to be overcome. University of Iowa political scientist Ben-
jamin Shambaugh, for example, argued that "commission gov-
ernment is the most democratic of all forms of municipal or-
ganization thus far devised" even though, he acknowledged,
"the old principle of the separation of powers is ignored, and
within the organization itself there is practically no provision
for checks and balances.""
Pro-commission reformers obfuscated the antidemocratic
potential of the charter by focusing on the purported ineffi-
ciency of Des Moines's existing government. Robert Fullerton,
vice-president of Chicago Lumber and Coal and trustee of the
Equitable Life Insurance Company, called the "present plan [of
goverrunent] . . . very defective and unbusinesslike." Attorney
Joseph A. Dyer described dty government as "incoherent and
debilitated." One of the directors of Iowa National Bank, attor-
ney Charles W. Johnston, wrote that commission government
provided the remedy for mimicipal inefficiency and claimed
that "all successful concerns in the business world are so man-
aged," citing the Uruted States Steel corporation as a "good il-
lustration." Several reformers also mentioned the city's press as
the most practical way to spread the gospel of centralized gov-
ernment. William G. McDougal, manager of the Armour Grain
23. At that time. Des Moines voters voted for a mayor, three aldermen (one
from their district and two at large), and treasurer, auditor, police judge, and
solicitor Under the new charter, the city council appointed the treasurer,
solicitor, and auditor. Rice, Progressive Cities, 34; Hamilton, Dethronement of
the City Boss, 198; Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Commission Government in Iowa: The
Des Moines Plan (Iowa City, 1912), 17; Cifizens' Committee, "The Proposed
Galveston-Des Moines Plan for City Government," A. J. Mathis Papers, State
Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines (hereafter dted as SHSl).
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Company, predicted that the "public press would be of invalu-
able service in educating our community," and Joseph Dyer
called on the dty's papers to join forces and "boost" reform "re-
pertorially [sic] and editorially each day."^ ^
During the early debate over the proposal, commission op-
ponents countered by attacking the origins and ultimate goals
of the Des Moines Plan as well as its antidemocratic substance.
Former People's Party delegate Leonard Brown, a frequent con-
tributor to Üie Iowa Unionist, called the "disparagement of City
Governments" the first step toward "bringing in of arbitrary
rule—the Russianizing of America in the interest of billionaire
trusts and of the millionaires that own all the means of enlight-
enment and control of public opinion—the press." Waving the
"bloody shirt," Brown described the incipient Des Moines Plan
as a threat to "popular liberty," and warned that the Galveston
Plan represented "the spawn of the ex-southern confederacy
now playing possum. Four years of bloody war to break up and
destroy freedom has not sufficed to satisfy hell-bom desire!" He
concluded that proponents of either of the two autocratic plans
must be either "imbeciles or traitors."^
Two weeks later, printer Amon Blank called Des Moines's
leading boosters "union wreckers" who used the booster idea as
"a cloak to secretly fight labor miions." He claimed that these
men, led by John Cownie and Commercial Club president Philo
C. Kenyon, had refused to involve trade unionists in the booster
campaign, and were attempting to destroy imionism in Des
Moines by "surreptitiously . . . railroad[ing] a bill through the
legislature placing this city under one man rule—the Galveston
plan." Although he was confused about the nature of the two
plans. Blank reminded the boosters that Des Moines's unionists
were also "vitally interested in the future development of the
city," and that they knew the importance of patronizing local
business. Nevertheless, Blank predicted that the city's urûon
workers would oppose "all schemes granting special privileges
to a few at the expense of the *^
24. Des Moines Register and Leader, 13 January 1907.
25. Ioim Unionist, 4 January 1907.
26. Iowa Unionist, 18 January 1907. Cownie owned the J. H. Cownie Glove
Company and was vice-president of the Iowa National Bank; Kenyon owned
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BY THE END OF FEBRUARY, reformers had submitted a
commission government plan to the Iowa legislature. Although
it was similar to the 1906 bill, the 1907 bill allowed or\ly cities
with populations greater than 25,000 to adopt commission gov-
ernment, and it included two direct democracy provisions
missing from the 1906 proposal: the initiative and referendum.
As the bill began its course through the legislature, the disparity
in resources available to the respective sides became clear: while
reformers disseminated their message through their powerful
allies in the dty's press, opponents had to petition the legislature.
Ehiring the last week of February, the Seventh Ward Municipal
Club, the Swedish-American Republican Club, the Uruted Car-
penters and Joiners of America (located in Des Moines), and the
Hebrew Republican Club sent petitions protesting the Galves-
ton Plan to the Senate. The Fourth and Sixth Ward Improvement
Leagues, the first precinct of the fourth ward, and Local No. 441
of the Electric Railway Employees of America joined the Sev-
enth Ward Club and the Swedish-American and Hebrew Re-
publicans in protesting the bill in the House. The petition sub-
mitted by the Hebrew Republican Club called the commission
plan, now known as the Des Moines Plan, "undemocratic" and
"penücious," "a subterfuge to deceive the people," and claimed
that the plan took "away from the common people the right to
choose their representatives in dty affairs." The petitions proved
ineffective, as the bill passed the legislature and was signed into
law by Governor Albert Cummins on March 29,1907.^
Having secured the legislation necessary to authorize cities
to choose the commission form of goverrunent, commission
proponents now had to secure sufficient names on a petition to
place the measure on the local ballot. On April 6, the News re-
ported that former Democratic congressman Walter H. Butler,
attorney Francis R. Koms, insurance broker Heruy H. Lantz,
attorney Sidney Dillon, dentist W. N. Heaton, real estate broker
the non-union Kenyon Printing and Manufacturing Company. According to
the News, Cownie's business had 133 employees, while Kenyon employed 45
to 50 workers. Des Moines City Register, 1907; Des Moines News, 12 May 1907.
27. Des Moines Register and Leader, 3 and 13 February and 30 March 1907; Des
Moines News, 30 March 1907; 1907 Iowa Senate Journal, 374, 385-86, 439, 522;
1907 Iowa House Journal, 473,492,602-3,885.
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Archibald Stewart, and land developer Buffon Walker would
coordinate the petition drive. In the next two days, 5,000 voters
signed the petition. During the petition drive, reformers left
nothing to diarice. In order to create the appearance of a mass
movement, they decided on "promiscuous" soliciting, because
"it would make it apparent to the much solicited man that here
was something doing." State Librarian and banker Johnson
Brigham exhorted his allies to "din the ears of Des Moines
voters" with the question "have you signed the petition?"^
On April 5, News editor E. A. Nye warned banqueting
commission proponents discussing the petition campaign that
he found "much prejudice against the new plan" among the
city's working men. At the close of Nye's remarks, business
owner Frank Evans emerged triumphantly from the kitchen of
the Shrine temple with a petition signed by ten waiters, and an-
nounced, "I thought I'd find out about thiat. Everyone of those
ten men out there signed for a change in the city government
and they are what Mr. Nye has called the 'salt of the earth.'"
African-American attorney S. Joe Brown rose amid the applause
to observe that "most of those out in the kitchen are colored
people."" When employers used similar tactics during the peti-
tion drive, the Iowa Unionist charged that they were using in-
timidation to gather signatures. The labor weekly reported that
when Des Moines laborers "were paid their wages, the petition
for signatures was presented with these polite (?) words; 'I want
you to sign that petition."'*'
Although the petition drive progressed smoothly, criticism
of the plan by the city's unions and working-class leaders
forced the commission discussion onto different terrain and the
reformers into a more defensive posture. Des Moines's three
daily newspapers continued to champion the plan while si-
multaneously "boosting" the city, but a shift in their rhetoric
suggests a desire to appeal to a broader audience, one that
might otherwise be convinced by the anti-commission critique
of the plan's antidemocratic character. At a March 10 meeting.
28. Des Moines News, 6 and 8 April 1907; Des Moines Capital, 6 April 1907.
29. Des Moines Capital, 6 Apú\ 1907.
30. Iowa Unionist, 12 AprU 1907.
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for example. Des Moines sodalists had passed a resolution claim-
ing that "the election of aldermen by wards enables the work-
ing class to secure representatives that they could not elect at
large," and calling the direct democracy provisions "fake[s] to
secure the adoption of the whole villainous system." Following
the successful petition drive, the Register and Leader began stres-
sing the democratic aspects of the plan. On April 14 an article
written by attomey and banker Ira M. Earle, one of the authors
of the commission bill, called the Des Moines Plan "essentially a
business government, 'by the people, of the people, and for the
people,'" and assured readers that the plan to centralize govern-
ing power was "subject to the reserve powers to be exercised by
the public directly."''
Unable to match reformers' resources or coerdve ability,
their opponents nevertheless continued to assail the plan's anti-
democratic elements. Printer D. H. Caldwell, editor of the Iowa
Unionist, called the reform movement a "plot to destroy repre-
sentative government," and tied it to "the attempt to destroy the
power of the union labor element." Opining that at-large elec-
tions and elimination of political parties "place all power of
government in the hands of a few," and were not in "the interest
of organized labor," he urged workers to "oppose any system
that proposes to eliminate parties and principles and thus de-
stroy representative government." Two weeks later, the labor
weekly likened the Des Moines Plan to "an oligarchic form of
government, as of Venice under the Doges."^^
These warnings failed to stem the momentum of the com-
mission movement. On April 22, the News boasted that Mayor
George Mattem had received a petition containing 6,032 names,
more than half the number of voters in the previous election."
BETWEEN THE END OF APRIL and the election on June 20,
the three Des Moines dailies, particularly the News and Register
and Leader, bombarded the dty's voters with a steady diet of pro-
commission and booster propaganda mixed with unfounded
31. Des Moines Register and Leader, 4 February, 11 March, 14 April 1907.
32. Iowa Unionist, 12 and 26 April 1907.
33. Des Moines News, 22 April 1907.
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accusations of municipal ineptitude and corruption. In mid-
May, the News called for the end of municipal graft and cited
several examples of "old city misrule." The paper claimed that
the city's coffers were always empty by April 1, a contention
contradicted by the city's cash surplus of over $350,000. The
daily also claimed that the Sixth Street Bridge had cost the city
over twice its initial estimate, that the imfinished library had
already exceeded its estimate by $75,000, that the spoils system
resulted in "needless exper\se and incompetent services," and
that the city's street cleaning service "has always been poorly
managed and unsatisfactory." Undaunted by flimsy evidence
and attenuated or nonexistent cormections between cost over-
runs and city officials, the News exposé signaled another tactical
shift in the commission campaign, as the exposure of ludicrous
city government "graft" became a feature of pro-commission
rhetoric during the final month of the campaign.
On May 15, the News charged that "the working men have
lost more money at the hands of the present administration . . .
than you can stack up in the council room." The paper implied
that part of the money went to City Solicitor William H.
Bremner and Aldermen W. H. Brereton and VNTilbur Fraley, who
allegedly had increased their net worth as the result of public
service. On June 14, the paper printed a confession from pro-
commission convert Alderman John L. Hamery, in which he
daimed, "I have discovered my mistake. The few honest men
on the council are powerless under the present system. If Des
Moines would have its municipal management rectified and the
corruption swept out of the dty hall it will be necessary to make
a radical change."^ Clearly, only the voters could put a stop to
this pervasive, but shadowy, mimidpal corruption.
34. Des Moines News, 13 May 1907. The bridge and library served as symbols of
either Des Moines's polifical corruption or its progress. While the papers used
cost overruns on the two structures to illustrate munidpal corruption, in
booster literature the Greater Des Moines Committee used them to symbolize
the dty's progress. Both were pictured in the committee's pamphlet. Des
Moines Means Opportunity, as examples of the latest in up-to-date architecture
and engineering know-how, two of many examples of how "Des Moines does
things." Greater Des Moines Committee, Des Moines Means Opportunity (Des
Moines, 1907), 15,46-47.
35. Des Moines News, 15 May and 14 June 1907.
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THE CONDITION, PAST. PRESENT AND FUTURE,
IF YOU, THE CITIZEN DO NOT BESTIR YOURSELF
This "Ding" Darling cartoon appeared in the Des Moines Register and
Leader, June 9,1907.
The Register and Leader chimed in with its own attacks on
murûcipal corruption. On June 9, it printed a cartoon showing a
perspiring and quizzical citizen holding a slop bucket labeled
"TAXES" and staring at an immense pig labeled "OLD CITY GOV'T.
RING" wallowing in an overflowing "PUBUC FEED TROUGH."
Waiting hungrily and vainly for their share of the food were pig-
lets on both sides of the trough. On one side were piglets rep-
resenting uncompleted city business; on the other, four piglets
representing examples of graft: the street cleaning, library, and
bridge scandals reported in the News and an obviously hungry
piglet labeled public improvements. On June 18, the Register and
Leader reported that the "City Hall Ring" admitted that thou-
sands of fraudulent voters were illegally on the dty's voter reg-
istration books. As in the case of the cost overruns and Hamery's
claim of corruption in the dty goverrunent, the story named no
names; the fraudulent voters appeared as if by magic, placed in
the books by an unknown hand and discovered in the nick of
time by the paper, thereby preventing the theft of the election and
the frustration of the popular will "by designing persons."^
36. Des Moines Register and Leader, 9 and 18 June 1907. See also editorials, ibid.,
18 and 19 June 1907; and Des Moines Capital, 8 and 10 June 1907.
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While the papers continued to find and report instances of
political corruption, reform spokespersons appeared at neighbor-
hood meetings prior to the election to address their opponents'
antidemocracy accusations. On June 5, Walter Butler assured a
meeting of fifty men at Sixth and Forest Avenues that the "Des
Moines plan is more representative than the present system....
people's representative rights should not and would not be
taken from them." The same evening, at a meeting of commis-
sion opponents at the Eighteenth Street fire station, attorney
R. J. Bannister claimed that the "new plan would establish a
regular star chamber system." Assistant City Solidtor W. M.
McLaughlin described the new plan as "monarchial govern-
ment" and predicted that its adoption would "rob the people
of their representative rights." The next night, pro-commission
attorney Silas Allen, at a good government meeting at Twentieth
and Forest, responded directly to Banrüster and McLaughlin's
criticisms, calling the existing city government undemocratic,
autocratic, and "directly opposed to the plan of the national
govemment/'^^
The press wrapped up the campaign with paternalistic ap-
peals to the city's African-American population, women, and
workers. Each of these appeals included a warning. Together
they illustrate both the disdain reform leaders held for these
groups and the vision of social hierarchy the reformers em-
braced. On June 17, the Register and Leader printed a message to
the dty's 600 African-American voters. Titled "To the Negro
Voters," the article urged black voters to support the commis-
sion plan because at-large elections would give them the op-
portunity to "vote for candidates in the east and west, north
and south parts of the city." Rather than having aldermen in
only two wards "who will give him a listening ear," the African-
American voter would command the respect of all potential
candidates as his vote "at once becomes an integral and impor-
tant factor in the election." The day following Ingham's appeal
to African Americans, the News urged the women of Des Moines
37. Dis Moines News. 7 June 1907. The same edition carried a front-page story
calling on working men to reject the alleged claim by Alderman J. O. Staley—
also editor of the Iowa Unionist—that he "owns" and "controls" 5,000 working
men.
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to "get your man to the polls." Claiming that the "city hall
gang" cleverly "denied [women] the right to vote upon the ex-
penditure of tax money for the building of a new dty hall" (a
bond election to be held at the same time as the referendum on
commission government), the paper urged the city's women to
"administer a rebuke to the gang that disfranchised them by a
stroke of the pen." Although the city's women could orüy "vote
by proxy," they could ensure their proxy's presence at the polls.^
Finally, the day before the election business owner Angus
Campbell promised the city's laborers that if the Des Moines
Plan passed they would not or\ly "find renewed demand" for
their labor but Üiat even in the event of a financial panic, the
city's credit would be so good that "she could inaugurate im-
portant enterprises that would employ great numbers of her
laboring people and thus in a measure tum away the calamity."
Campbell urged workers to "look at the matter from the stand-
point of your own welfare/' and to reject the demagogues
"howl[ing] from the woods about your losing your political lib-
erties." He closed by threatening that if the Des Moines Plan
went down to defeat because of "deluded working men throw-
ing their balance of power against its adoption... laboring men
will be the great sufferers." In an unstable economic environ-
ment that would culminate in the October panic of 1907, work-
ers ignored Campbell's warning at their peril, and it is not hard
to imagine employers issuing similar wamings to workers
throughout the city In a public forum, Campbell had put the
dty's workers on notice: everyone who wanted to keep their job
should support the Des Moines Plan.^
Thus on consecutive days, two of the city's dailies had
warned African Americans and women that the new plan's de-
feat would perpetuate their political impotence, and threatened
the city's workers that their jobs were at risk if the plan failed.
Rhetorically, each appeal positioned the reformers as protective
38. Des Moines Registerand Leader, 17 June 1907; Des Moines News. 18 June 1907.
39. Des Moines Register and Leader, 19 June 1907. The Panic of 1907 is discussed
in numerous works. For a brief but interesting interpretation of its effects on
labor and local reform and on perceptions of the wealthy elite's right to rule,
see Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919
(New York, 1987), 212-15.
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Percentage of Voters Rejecting the Des Moines Plan, by Ward,
Compared to Percentage of Working-Class Residents in Each Ward
• % Working-class
•% Voting "No"
Ward 1 i 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 0 6 6 6 7 7 7 7
Ptednet 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4
Note: Wards were numbered west to east, with the first ward in the ex-
treme west and the seventh ward in the extreme east. Wards 1-4 were on
the west side of the river; wards 5-7 were on the east. The classification of
working-class residents follows John F. O'Connell, "Des Moines Adopts
the Commission Form of Municipal Government" (M.A. thesis, Drake
University, 1975), 99-110, 173-76. O'Connell used statistical sampling to
create a class profile of Des Moines's seven wards. The 1907 election re-
sults demonstrate the salience of class in the conmiission election, Ac-
cording to O'Connell, the city's upper class lived primarily in precincts
two, three, and four in the first ward. These three precincts ranked third,
second, and fourth in support for commission government, with percent-
ages ranging from 77.4 to 79.7. The city's poorest residents, as well as large
numbers of foreign-bom residents, resided in the fourth and fifth wards.
The seventh ward, where more than 60 percent of voters rejected the pro-
posal, contained the highest percentage of "average working-class people."
parents of their potentially willful children and implied that if
the children behaved properly, they would receive parental ap-
proval and possible material rewards; if they failed to heed pa-
rental admonitions, they faced an uncertain future devoid of
parental protection.
On Jime 20,1907, Des Moines voters, by a 60 percent major-
ity approved the "Des Moines Plan." The election results ex-
posed the dty's class divisions, as the measure lost in the city's
eastside wards while westside voters approved the plan over-
whelmingly. Voting patterns reflected a close correlation be-
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tween the percentage of working-class residents and rejection of
the proposal (see chart).*^ In the glow of triumph, the Register
and Leader called the vote "a victory for the whole of the dty."
While the Register and Leader congratulated the voters, the Capi-
tal celebrated the triumph of business opporturuty. Crediting the
Greater Des Moines Committee and the city's press for the vic-
tory, Lafayette Young editorialized that the committee "by its
wise action has added nearly fifty per cent to the value of real
estate and as a consequence has added to the general prosperity,
helping every man, woman and child." Young saw the election
as a "vote of confidence to the three hundred business men who
spent their time and money in attempting to secure a more effi-
cient form of city government." He also stressed the importance
to the drive of a "united press." Young promised that both the
Greater Des Moines Committee and the Commercial Club would
do their "part in the future as in the past," but warned that all
their good works would come to naught unless "wise, maselfish
and patriotic men" were elected commissioners.*'
THE CAMPAIGN to elect their own candidates proved to be a
critical weakness in the reform strategy. Eight days after the elec-
tion, the Unionist gave fair warning that "the labor element can
put a crimp in the aspiratior\s of many politidans and boodeling
[sic] business men who have been mentioned by the newspaper
combine for czarships."*^ To prevent a successful assault on the
second part of their strategy, reformers attempted valiantly to
keep their coalition intact. Unfortunately for them, the alliance
cracked, as several interrelated factors contributed to the inability
of the city's "better" elements to elect the men of their choice:
resistance to the businessman's ticket supported and champi-
oned by the reform press; the defection of the News, destroying
the press uruty that had been so effective in the commission cam-
paign; and the candidacy of popular ex-mayor John MacVicar,
40. Hays, "Politics of Reform," 162; Des Moines Capital, 21 June 1907; Des
Moines Register and Leader, 21 June 1907; O'Connell, "Des Moines Adopts
Commission Government," 99-110,173-76.
41. Des Moines Register and Leader, 21 June 1907; Des Moines Capital, 21 June 1907.
42. Iowa Unionist, 28 June 1907.
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whose pivotal presence in the race for commissioner would
undermine the efforts of the business leaders who sought to
control city politics.
After the commission charter survived a constitutional chal-
lenge, reform leaders faced the task of electing their men to run
the new system. As Lafayette Young's post-election comments
made clear, reformers considered the election of the right kind
of men to run the new government the ultimate goal of their
scheme to refashion munidpal politics. The new charter pro-
vided for an open primary to be held two weeks before the reg-
ular election. Any qualified voter could appear on the primary
ballot by submitting a statement of candidacy supported by a
petition attesting to the candidate's character and judgment
signed by 25 qualified electors. Following the primary election,
the two mayoral candidates and the eight council candidates
with the highest vote totals would advance to the regular non-
partisan election. The simple filing procedures resulted in 71 men
declaring their candidacy for the five seats on the commission."
The men in control of the reform campaign realized the
importance of unity in the upcoming campaign, but internal
squabbling eventually destroyed the powerful alliance between
the reformers and the daily newspapers. Letters exchanged be-
tween John Hamilton and John MacVicar reveal the machina-
tions of the reform leaders and demonstrate how their coalition
fractured under the stress of choosing the right candidates. On
October 18,1907, Hamilton told MacVicar that "Harvey Ingham
read the riot act to me on a street comer today" and warned
him that the Register and Leader editor "incidentally gave notice
to you, through me, that unless you come in with the rest of the
Des Moines plan supporters and help agree on a ticket, he will
give you a fight such as you never experienced in all your life."**
In mid-November, Hamilton described the difficulties re-
form leaders were having in holding their movement together.
At a meeting at the westside Grant Club, bankers Homer Miller
and John Cowrüe, attorneys Ira Earle and Sidney Dillon, news-
43. Rice, Progressive Cities, 49. The Iowa Supreme Court declared the commis-
sion plan constitutional on 18 February 1908. Shambaugh, Commission Gov-
ernment in Iowa, 29-31.
44. John J. Hamilton to John MacVicar, 18 October 1907, MacVicar Papers, SHSI.
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paper men Harvey Ingham, Lafayette Young, and Gardner
Cowles, businessmen Eugene Waterbury, James Hill, and James
Olmsted, construction company president Edward Crellin, and
insurance man James Van Evera, discussed tactics for the up-
coming election. They agreed that "there must be a labor repre-
sentative on the slate, but that [State Trades' Council president
Al] Urick would treat as a 'traitor' any man who was put for-
ward." Hamilton reported that Ingham rejected the suggestion
of attorney J. M. Parsons to let the situation develop without
"private manipulation." The editor told the group, "this time
we must act together and put the new law in the hands of its
friends." Banker J. W. Hill assured the group that the "three
dailies had promised him and others that they would support
the ticket selected by the [Committee of] 300." The meeting
adjourned after dedding to appoint a committee of seven to
"canvass the situation as to candidates," and admonishing the
attendees to "not reveal what was done to outsiders.""^
Just five days later, Hamilton reported to MacVicar that Billy
Hale, the editor of the News, might desert the alliance. Excluded
from the insider deliberations of reform leaders. Hale assured
Hamilton that the News "is not tied up in any hard and fast
ticket," that the daily would "retain its independence," or per-
haps "select its own ticket." Hale's subsequent defection made a
prophet of MacVicar, who on 18 November had predicted that
"it will not be possible to get a slate through the Committee of
300 without a serious split."**
Reformers particularly feared a potential MacVicar candi-
dacy. Although one prominent reformer, Robert FuUerton, con-
sidered him honest and concerned about "everybody's interests
and rights," the leading clique worried that they would be un-
able to control him and desperately tried to keep him out of the
race. Despite MacVicar's support of the commission plan, John
Hamilton wrote that most of the leaders of the movement re-
garded the ex-mayor as a "firebrand" whose "strong personal-
ity" would undoubtedly dominate any ticket he was part of.
45. John J. Hamilton to John MacVicar, 15 November 1907, MacVicar Papers,
SHSI.
46. John J. Hamilton to John MacVicar, 20 November 1907; John MacVicar to
John J. Hamilton, 18 November 1907, MacVicar Papers, SHSI.
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and therefore "tabooed his name from the start."" In late Octo-
ber MacVicar informed City Treasurer John B. Lucas that he had
"been served with due notice by certain editors in Des Moines
that if I refuse to come in and help elect a ticket they shall name,
I will be hammered into the earth." He also told Lucas that he
had "absolute proof" that Young and Ingham had made election-
eve threats toward the public service (primarily street railroad)
corporations that "got them to lay down on their fight against
the Plan. . . . I have a curiosity to know just what these two
newspaper men promised in return for supporting the fight. I be-
lieve I know, but am not absolute [sic] sure."^ MacVicar never de-
scribed his "absolute proof" or the nature of the threats, but in a
letter to Walter Butler he charged that the two newspaper men
had engaged in political log-rolling, securing the support of the
public service corporations in exchange for a promise to nomi-
nate candidates "acceptable to the public service corporations."
According to Rice, keeping MacVicar "off the commission" em-
bodied the "key to the agreement," because the franchise own-
ers apparently considered the mandatory referenda on public
franchises in the Des Moines Plan a lesser evil "than the possi-
bility of a munidpal takeover that MacVicar might lead."*^
Two weeks later, MacVicar wrote to John Hamilton, warning
him to "be very careful whom you ally yourself with, particu-
larly in any selection of candidates." He cautioned that "the
next fight will have to be along different lines from former cam-
paigns. The business interests must be looked after and they are
liable to be very active." MacVicar saw Young and Ingham as
potential problems, predicting that the Register and Capital
would "try a ticket. . . . One thing they have in mind is to cap-
ture the union labor vote, and this will be done by false pre-
tenses. I hope these boys won't be fooled." He suggested that
if he and Hamilton could prevent the News from joirüng the
"scheme on the part of the Register and Capital to maintain the
47. Hamilton, Dethronement ofthe City Boss, 161.
48. Robert Fuilerton to [John] Hamilton, 9 December 1907, and John MacVicar
to John B. Lucas, 25 October 1907, MacVicar Papers, George M. Sheets Collec-
tion of Iowana, Special Collectior\s, University of Iowa.
49. John MacVicar to Walt Butler, 25 October 1907, MacVicar Papers, SHSI;
Rice, Progressive Cities, 44-45.
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role of dictator . . . they won't do much harm."^ Thus, in addi-
tion to illuminating the political infighting among Des Moines's
reformers, MacVicar echoed some of the same concerns labor
unions had expressed about the autocratic potential of commis-
sion government.
As November turned into December, Hamilton reported that
opposition to MacVicar was hardening. Despite the poor perfor-
mance of "Harvey's machine," Hamilton cautioned MacVicar
that "the men who control public opinion in this town are now
largely against you," and that a great deal of "hard, personal
work" would be necessary to "neutralize the hostility that has
been worked up against you among the business and profes-
sional men."^'
Finally, reform leaders of the newly expanded Committee of
Five Hundred decided on five candidates. Their "Citizen's" or
"Des Moines Plan" ticket included businessnaan and incumbent
at-large alderman Eugene Waterbury for mayor, and attomey
Henry C. Evans, college professor James R. Hanna, land devel-
oper and lumber company owner Buffon S. Walker, and coal
company owner Charles S. Worth for city council. Opponents
quickly dubbed this group of men the "silk sox ticket" or the
"slate." All of the candidates belonged to social register families
and possessed the requisite business or professional pedigrees,
reflecting the reform belief that the "best citizens" of the city
should govem.^ ^ Along with the reform slate, a dizzying variety
of other combinations emerged during the election.
50. John MacVicar to John [HamUton], 7 November 1907, MacVicar Papers,
Sheets Collection.
51. John J. Hamilton to John MacVicar, 30 November, 9 and 10 December 1907,
MacVicar Papers, SHSI.
52. Hamilton, Dethronement cfthe City Boss, 161; Iowa Unionist, 14 March 1908;
Rice, Progressive Cities, 49. According to Johnson Brigham, MacVicar enjoyed
considerable support among the Committee of Five Hundred. In January com-
mittee members participated in a referendum to select their candidates for the
upcoming election. Ira Earle received 46 votes for mayor, with MacVicar fin-
ishing third among the ten vote-getters. For the council, MacVicar, with 72 votes,
fiiushed first among the 28 men who received votes. Brigham, Des Moines,
1:402-3.
53. Competing against the "Des Moines" slate were the "Democratic slate,"
"City Hall Slate," "Prohibitionist's Slate," "Scratcher Slate," and the "Civic
League Ticket." Des Moines Register and Leader, 8 March 1908; Des Moines Demo-
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While the Des Moines Plan ticket attracted little support
from labor, the News led the opposition with a populist assault
on the "slate" candidates. Before the nonpartisarx primary, the
paper declared that the ticket should be called "the Des Moines
Corporation ticket," and accused Young and Ingham of prom-
ising the public corporatioris that "John Mac\^car would not be
given a place on the first board of councilmen." According to
the News, Young and Ingham engaged in fraud when they ig-
nored MacVicar, contrary to "the wishes of the majority of their
own committee," and when they urged the people "to pay no
attention to the part which the corporations played" in the se-
lection of their candidates." The News consistently provided a
powerful public forum for opponents of the "slate," a forum
that had not existed during the 1907 commission campaign.
On March 16, four of the five Des Moines Plan candidates
survived the primary election, but they were obviously in trou-
ble. According to the Register and Leader, "if there is to be a gen-
eral rallying of all the forces of opposition it is apparent that
they [the Des Moines Plan candidates] will not be elected."
Indeed, police court judge and real estate broker Adaniram J.
Mathis had garnered 2,000 votes more than Des Moines Plan
mayoral candidate Waterbury. Of the three successful council
candidates, only one, fourth-place finisher Charles Worth, ranked
in the top four. Much to the chagrin of Ingham and Young, John
MacVicar proved the most popular candidate, attracting 6,399
votes, followed by first ward alderman John Hamery, and Dep-
uty Sheriff J. Wesley Ash. More ominous than the vote totals
were the ward residts. The "Des Moines Flan" candidates at-
tracted little support outside the affluent first ward. About 25
percent of Waterbury and Worth's support came from that ward,
which also provided nearly 29 percent of Harma and Walker's
With little time until the regular election, the final two weeks
became a contest between the four remaining members of the
cratic Chronicle, 6 and 20 February 1908; Iowa Unionist, 14 March 1908; O'Connell,
"Des Moines Adopts Commission Government," 129-30.
54. Des Moines News, 9 March 1908.
55. Des Maines Capital, 17 March 1908; Des Moines Register and Leader, 18 March
1908.
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"slate" and an alternative group of candidates backed by a va-
riety of groups. Police Court Judge Adaniram Mathis opposed
Waterbury for mayor; contractor and alderman-at-Iarge William
Brereton and city assessor Charles Schramm rounded out the
council field. The "Des Moines Plan" ticket of Waterbury,
Hanna, Walker, and Worth refused to appear with other candi-
dates, as they had during the primary campaign, underscoring
the elite nature of the four candidates and giving credence to
their opponents' attacks on their autocratic potential.^^ In con-
trast to the commission election, opponents of the elite ticket
possessed a public voice in the News as well as an alternative
not present in 1907. Rather than defending an existing political
system, the anti-Des Moines Plan forces offered attractive op-
tions, for middle-class as well as working-class voters, to the
"slate" candidates.
While the Register and Leader and Capital endorsed the elite
ticket, the Iowa Unionist endorsed Hamery and Ash, in addition
to giving warm support to Mathis and Schramm. Although not
opposing MacVicar, the Unionist questioned the sincerity of his
pro-labor stance and asked why {he News, whose political col-
umns MacVicar controlled, ignored "Wesley Ash—labor's rec-
ognized candidate?"" For its part, the News endorsed MacVicar,
Schramm, and Hamery, opposed the entire "Citizen's" ticket,
and turned its strident rhetoric on the elite candidates, accusing
them of fraud in their election expense statements. At a March
27 labor meeting, printer Edward Campbell called the expense
statements a "two-faced, point blank lie," and claimed that he
had received many "circulars and other literature through the
mail boosting the silk sox candidates."^ Thus, the political rhet-
oric had come full circle from 1907, as the reformers now stood
accused publicly of the kind of questionable politics their system
and their candidates opposed and would ostensibly eliminate.
As the campaign concluded, the Register and Leader im-
plored the city's voters to support the elite candidates. In con-
trast to the appeals that had marked the final days of the com-
56. Rice, Progressive Cities, 49.
57. Iowa Unionist, 28 March 1908.
58. Des Moines Neiüs, 28 March 1908.
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mission campaign, the daily tried to cajole voters into realizing
the importance of the right candidates to the success of the new
government. Harvey Ingham timidly asked, "Is two years too
much to discover whether business methods applied to dty af-
fairs will bring about the results business methods bring about
in private affairs?" The editor, on the eve of seeing his political
vision destroyed by a recalcitrant electorate, called Waterbury,
Walker, Hanna, and Worth, "clean men, . . . young men,. .. suc-
cessful men . . . [who] know what it is to struggle for what they
get . . . who can be relied upon to do what they say." Juxtaposed
with Ingham's anxiety stood the confidence of D. H. Caldwell's
Iowa Unionist. Speaking for the laboring men of Des Moines,
Caldwell asserted that labor "claimed for herself the right of
representation on the commissions to be selected—has votes to
determine the matter her own way." Calling on workers to elect
Ash and Hamery, the weekly left the other three choices up to
each voter's conscience. Drawing on the same rhetoric it had
used to oppose the commission plan, the labor paper simply
asked for representation on the new council, not for the control
reformers sought."
On March 30, 1908, voters elected Mathis mayor, and
MacVicar, Ash, Schramm, and Hamery to the council. Mathis
received 60 percent of the vote and enjoyed a nearly 4,000-vote
advantage over Waterbury. In the council election, the Des
Moines Plan candidates finished fifth, sixth, and eighth in the
eight-man field. Worth, the fifth-place finisher, received 1,600
fewer votes than Schramm, who firushed fourth. MacVicar, with
nearly 10,000 votes, proved the most popular candidate in the
field. Waterbury won only 5 of 29 precincts, 3 in the first ward.
On the east side of the river, he drew only 28 percent of the vote.
The other Des Moines Plan candidates also fared poorly on the
east side. Worth firüshing sixth, Hanna seventh, and Walker
eighth. Ash, who finished second by 1,600 votes to MacVicar,
outpoUed the former mayor in the working-class wards by 93
votes. Even in the first ward, Waterbury won only 54 percent of
the vote, while Hanna firushed fourth. Worth fifth, and Walker
eighth in the council race. Thus, as Bradley Rice points out, the
59. Des Moines Register and Leader, 30 March 1908; Iowa Unionist, 28 March 1908.
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1908 election did not necessarily represent a "repudiation of
the new system." Instead, Des Moines's voters, particularly
working-class voters, repudiated the people chosen by the city's
elites to head the new government.**
IN DES MOINES between 1905 and 1908, a spirited attack by
working-class spokespersons on the antidemocratic potential of
commission government bared the intentioris of a small group
of businessmen to restructure city government to enable them
to shape Des Moines's political and economic future. Working-
class voters constituted the largest group opposed to the com-
mission plan, but the entire city participated in the defeat of the
ticket selected by reform leaders. Thus, while failing to save a
ward-based direct representation system. Des Moines's workers
and their leaders managed to battle their opponents to a draw
by winning a place in the new government. Although the city's
voters indicated in 1907 that they preferred a more centralized
form of municipal government, less than a year later they sent a
clear message to reformers that they would not submit to elite
control. Reformers tried to reformulate their rhetoric to appeal
to a wide audience, but their hand-picked candidates engen-
dered little enthusiasm among middle-class and working-class
voters. In 1908 Des Moines's voters shattered the elite dream of
a business-controlled government, exposed the limits of reform
ideology, and signaled the city's "leading citizens" that they
preferred more political control than reformers were willing to
offer.
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